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1. Introduction 
 
The threat of climate change caused by air emissions is a global problem that 
requires global instruments to be addressed. The absence of a commitment to implement 
tools at a global scale is one of the major difficulties to reach an international agreement 
after Kyoto, and one of the main limits of the policies implemented so far.  
In this context, there is currently an important debate regarding carbon-motivated 
border tax adjustment (CBTA). CBTA is a trade instrument that consists in tariffs on 
imported products applied by countries that are implementing local policies to reduce 
emissions (hereafter abating regions). CBTA is designed to remedy the main drawback of 
unilateral emission control: emission reduction policies applied only locally create a gap 
between the price of domestic and foreign products that compete in the same market. To 
level out different treatments to domestic and foreign goods, or using a recurring 
expression to “level the carbon playing field” (Houser et al. 2008, Krugman 2009), 
CBTA tariffs would be imposed on products imported from all countries that are not 
applying the carbon control policy (hereafter non-abating regions). This would 
compensate for the loss of competitiveness that a carbon tax may imply for domestic 
producers, and it would avoid possible emission leakage involved in unilateral emission 
reduction policies (Lockwood and Whalley 2010, Horn and Sapir 2013).
1
  
The viability of this tool has already reached the political agenda of countries like 
United States (USA) and the European Union (EU) (Mattoo et al., 2009, Kuik, 2010). In 
2009 the USA government proposed to implement an emission trade mechanism, the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act (American House of Representative, 2009).
2
 
Although finally the act was not approved, the proposal included the border adjustment as 
a competitiveness measure to ensure the equal distribution of costs in the absence of an 
international agreement limiting emissions. In the same year also the EU expressed 
worries about possible carbon leakage caused by the European Emission Trading Scheme 
(ETS). In the revised ETS directive (European Parliament and Council, 2009), the EU 
evaluated the inclusion of importers in the Community scheme. Also international trade 
authorities such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) have already reckoned the 
relevance of CBTA (see UNEP and WTO 2009, and Hillman 2013).  
However, CBTA has not been implemented so far. Its application might be 
difficult due to the several issues that it arises. These issues are, for example, CBTA 
                                                          
1
 To better justify CBTA, Horn and Sapir (2013) refer to international externalities that arise when 
countries combat emissions unilaterally. Indeed, countries implementing unilateral climate policy 
face the full costs of their abatement efforts, receiving only part of the benefits that are spread 
across the world. As a result, they will typically choose sub-optimal climate policies exposing each 
other to more climate damage than would be internationally efficient, that is, exposing each other 
to international externalities.  
2
 The American Clean Energy and Security Act was a US energy bill that, if approved by the 
Senate too, would have established an emission trading mechanism similar to the European Union 
Emission Trading Scheme. 
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compatibility with the international legal framework established by the WTO, what 
countries and what products should be involved, or how non-abating regions would 
respond to such a tax on their imports. 
In particular, in this paper we focus on the so-called CBTA metric or, in other 
terms, what criteria should be applied to compute emissions related to imported products. 
Indeed, tariffs can be computed through different methods. One method is to compute the 
tariffs based on the emissions contained in each imported product, taking into account the 
technology and resources actually used to produce them. We call this method CBTA on 
embodied emissions. Alternatively, the tariff could be based on the emissions embodied 
in the same good produced by the abating region, as if the foreign product would have 
been produced with the technology available domestically. We call this method CBTA on 
avoided emissions. 
The debate revolves around three implications of these different metrics. The first 
one is its compatibility with the WTO legal framework. The WTO regulation detailed by 
GATT (1994) permits import duties not in excess to those applied to like domestic 
products (Mattoo et al. 2009, Hillman 2013). Therefore, tariffs calculated on avoided 
emissions are more justifiable as a trade policy. The second dimension is the political 
feasibility in terms of practical implementation. Also in this case CBTA on avoided 
emissions is easier to be implemented because it implies no discrimination among 
exporting countries. Moreover it requires less information on the emission embodied in 
imported products. The third dimension is the CBTA environmental effectiveness. While 
CBTA on embodied emissions is based on the actual emission content of each product, 
CBTA on avoided emissions might be less effective as an environmental policy, since it 
would not give any incentive for exporting countries to implement more environmentally-
friendly technologies.  
Focusing on the different methods of designing a CBTA system, in this paper we 
analyze to what extent the two CBTA metrics would affect differently different products 
imported from different countries. In particular, we assume a unilateral carbon tax 
implemented in the EU, and we simulate a corresponding CBTA system to show the 
different tax rates that each metric implies. We use a multi-region and multi-sector 
analysis to know for which countries and products the method used is critical. The results 
of this paper might contribute to the political debate by adding information on the 
different effects for different products and countries.  
There is an already vast literature on CBTA (see Ghosh et al. 2012 for a survey). 
Some papers analyze and compare different metrics of computing CBTA tariffs, although 
they do not consider all the connections among sectors and countries that characterize the 
production processes nowadays and that determine emissions too. Mathiesen and 
Maestad (2004), Kuik and Hofkes (2009), and Lin and Li (2011) consider only direct 
emissions of different sectors through sectors’ emission intensity. Alternatively, Burniaux 
et al. (2013) consider the sum of direct emissions and emissions embodied in sectors’ 
electricity use. 
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Instead, other papers takes into account countries’ and sectors’ interconnections 
to determine CBTA rates but they do not offer a comparison between different policy 
designs. Atkinson et al. (2011) focus on emissions embodied in domestic production and 
emissions embodied in consumption. Dissou and Eyland (2011) analyze different CBTA 
recycling methods. Ghosh et al. (2012) focus on efficiency and distributional 
consequences of CBTA calculated only on CO2 emissions or CBTA calculated on 
different greenhouse gases (GHG). Finally, Schenker et al. (2012) analyse CBTA in 
terms of output variation, welfare effect, carbon leakage, and trade composition. 
Up to now, only three papers - Mattoo et al. (2009), Böhringer et al. (2012), and 
Elliott et al. (2012) - consider both issues together: they compare different CBTA designs 
taking into account all inter-country inter-sector interdependencies.  
In particular, Mattoo et al. (2009) assess the different impact of CBTA based on 
non-abating regions’ emissions and CBTA based on abating region’s emissions. They 
consider several non-abating regions,
3
 assuming unilateral emissions reductions of 17% 
by 2020 in high income countries (EU, USA, Japan, and other United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Annex-I countries). They use a computable 
general equilibrium model based on 2004 data from the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP). The main finding is that CBTA on non-abating regions’ emissions implies 
average tariffs for India and China of over 20% and depresses manufacturing exports 
between 16 and 21%. Moreover, CBTA on abating region’s emissions addresses the 
competitiveness problems without so many damages for exporting countries.  
Böhringer et al. (2012) compute the efficiency impact of different CBTA designs, 
analyzing three different regulating coalitions: Europe, UNFCCC Annex-I regions except 
for Russia, and a broad coalition that includes China. They simulate a unilateral cap at 
80% of the abating regions’ emissions. CBTA varies among three dimensions: embodied 
carbon coverage (direct, direct and electricity-related, or total emissions), sector coverage 
(energy-intensive trade-exposed goods, or all goods), tariff rate differentiation (country- 
and sector-specific, or sector-specific tariffs). Using 2004 GTAP data, they find that 
systems more likely to comply with international law yield very little in terms of carbon 
leakage and efficiency.  
Elliott et al. (2012) analyze the extent of emission reduction of a wide range of 
carbon tax schemes in Kyoto protocol Annex-B countries, the expected carbon leakage, 
and the effect of CBTA. They simulate both CBTA on embodied emissions as well as 
CBTA on emissions related to production technologies in importing countries. Using 
2004 GTAP data through a computational general equilibrium model, they show the 
importance of global taxes: carbon taxes only in Kyoto protocol Annex-B have low 
potential to reduce emissions. They also find that CBTA on abating region’s emissions 
can be significantly inferior at reducing emissions than CBTA on non-abating regions’ 
emissions. This is mainly due to the lack of incentives for foreign producers to adapt less-
polluting technologies. 
                                                          
3
 High income countries except for the abating regions, Brazil, China, India, Russia, rest of East 
Asia, rest of South Asia, rest of Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-
Saharan Africa, rest of Latin America Countries. 
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Our work follows the proposal of these three papers, with some differences. First, 
they focus on the broad effects of CBTA in terms of output, competitiveness or 
environmental goals using computational general equilibrium models. Instead, we 
propose a static analysis to show what tax level each policy design would imply at a 
product-based and at a country-based level. In this way the analysis provides different 
information. It shows not only the intensity of different CBTA metrics through the 
average effect for each country, but also the spread or concentration of CBTA designs 
among different products of different countries providing additional information to assess 
the feasibility of this policy.  
Second, we focus in particular on the EU due to its position about carbon pricing. 
Indeed, on the one hand, the EU debate on pricing carbon emissions has a long history 
started in the early 1990s. Moreover, the EU is already implementing different policies 
for emission control such as the ETS or the European Energy Tax Directive (ETD), a tax 
on the use of energy products aimed at reducing emissions. Anyway, these main policies 
implemented so far are still weak or poorly performing.
4
 For this reason there are ongoing 
political debates to strengthen them in order to reach the challenging environmental 
targets the EU has set itself.
5
 Despite the political difficulties in advancing in carbon 
taxation in the EU, we believe it is important to revive the debate on implementing a 
harmonised EU carbon tax as a powerful climate change tool to reduce emissions. Since 
CBTA has already been feared as possible for complementing a carbon tax, it seems 
important to analyse all the critical issues that they would imply, among them what 
method should be used to compute them.   
Third, since we take into account emissions embodied in trade flows, while the 
previous studies use the GTAP database we employ the World Input Output Database 
(WIOD) that is better suited with the scope of our analysis. 
Finally, we also explore additional methodological issues that arise from the use 
of multi-region multi-sector models to compute the different CBTA regimes. In this paper 
we suggest the need of considering avoided emissions in order to compute CBTA based 
on emissions related to the abating region’s technology. Indeed, if tariffs are computed 
considering only (direct and indirect) emissions produced domestically, the fiscal load 
applied to foreign products would be lower than the fiscal treatment for domestic 
products: due to the adoption of CBTA, domestic goods would be indeed taxed based on 
their avoided emissions, being also the imported inputs taxed. So, to compute avoided 
emissions for analyzing border tax based on the domestic technology, we apply the so-
called “domestic technology assumption” (DTA).  
Concerning the use of DTA, a second issue regards international price 
differences. As we have analyzed in Arto et al. (2014), the usual way of estimating 
                                                          
4
The European ETD currently in force fixes very low tax rates for the most part of fuel uses and 
does not explicitly tax energy products according to their carbon emissions; looking at the ETS, 
during the last years the carbon price has been too low to give a strong price signal (European 
Parliament and Council, 2009). 
5
 In addition to the ETS Directive , in 2001 the European Commission already proposed to modify 
the ETD in order to introduce an explicit carbon tax component (European Commission, 2011). 
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emissions according the DTA could significantly bias the outcomes. The implicit 
assumption usually applied is that prices of imported goods are equal to prices of the 
same products produced at home. For this reason in this paper we estimate avoided 
emissions correcting for the differences in prices of imported and domestically produced 
goods using trade data in physical units.  
 
2. Method 
A CBTA is a tax on the emissions of products imported by any region or country 
to compensate for different carbon policies (and especially carbon taxes) on products 
from different origins that compete in the same market. The tax base of this tariff can be 
calculated in two ways. The first method, the so-called embodied emissions, takes into 
account that production processes are often global and emissions produced in each stage 
of production are produced in different places; it accounts for all emissions embodied in 
imports. The second method, the so-called avoided emissions, takes into account 
emissions contained in an identical hypothetical product produced entirely in the abating 
region or country; in this way it accounts for emissions avoided by importing goods. 
Let us consider an example: the EU imports cans of tuna from Taiwan. This tuna 
has been fished in Korea, using boats and fishing rods produced in Japan. Emissions 
embodied in a can of tuna include emissions in Korea but also in Japan. Alternatively, 
emissions avoided in the EU by importing cans of tuna from Taiwan are the emissions 
that the EU would emit fishing the tuna and producing the can, the boat and the rods 
inside the EU. 
We use an environmentally extended (ee) multi-regional input-output (MRIO) 
model to calculate emissions embodied in imports. In this case, let us consider a world 
consisting of c countries, each composed by n sectors.
6
 Matrix   represents the inter-
country inter-sector deliveries in the world, where its element    
   shows the amount of 
output from sector i in country r consumed as intermediate input by sector j in country s. 
Matrix A represents the world input structure, where each element    
   is obtained as 
   
      
    
  , being   
  the total output of sector i in country r. A permits to define the 
Leontief inverse          , where any element    
   reveals additional direct and 
indirect output that sector i of county r produces for an additional monetary unit of sector 
j in country s. An ee-MRIO adds information on emission intensity   
  obtained dividing 
total emissions by sector over total output produced by each sector. Using this additional 
information we compute     , where any element    
   reveals the emissions that sector 
i of country r produces for an additional unit of sector j in country s. 
Then, we re-allocate emissions by sector to emissions by product, taking into 
account that each sector can produce different products and also that any product can 
                                                          
6
 Matrices are indicated by bold, upright capital letters; vectors by bold, upright lower case letters; 
and scalars by italicized lower case letters. Vectors are columns by definition, so that row vectors 
are obtained by transposition, indicated by a prime. A diagonal matrix with the elements of any 
vector on its main diagonal and all other entries equal to zero is indicated by a circumflex. 
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actually be produced by different sectors. Coming back to the previous example: let us 
consider that the Taiwanese cans for tuna are made of aluminum. These cans are mainly 
produced by the aluminum-processing sector. Imagine that in Taiwan some firms from 
the manufactured-food sector buy cans, whereas other firms buy aluminum and makes 
cans by themselves as a secondary production. To apply the CBTA to imported cans of 
tuna, the EU needs to know the emissions embodied in each can of tuna that cross the 
border from Taiwan to the EU regardless if the can has been produced by the aluminum-
processing sector or by the manufactured-food sector. So, we use a rectangular matrix U 
of dimension [(n x c) x (m x c)] to link the information at a sector level to different 
products m. U is a diagonal block matrix, where    
   shows the share of product k of 
country s produced by sector i in country r. Finally emissions embodied in any product is 
obtained as a (m x c)-dimensional vector   equal to       , being i a one’s vector of 
appropriate dimensions. 
A similar procedure is necessary for emissions avoided by importing goods. In 
that case we use an environmentally-extended single region input-output (ee-IO) model 
applying the so-called domestic technology assumption (DTA).
 
 We calculate the amount 
of emissions that would have been contained in a domestic product if all its inputs were 
produced with the technology available domestically in region R. So, emissions by sector 
per unit of output are represented by        , where    is the vector of emission 
intensities for region R and    is the Leontief inverse derived from the matrix of total 
input coefficients of the region   , which includes domestic and imported inputs. As 
before, emissions by product are calculated as          , where    is a (n x m) 
matrix showing the share of any product k produced by any sector i of the region. 
Finally, we obtain the CBTA   by multiplying the tax rate t that the region is 
applying to the carbon content of domestic products times the emissions per monetary 
unit of imported product. For emissions embodied in imports we simply have     , 
whereas the equivalent for emissions avoided by importing goods needs a further 
consideration. Given that the same product has different prices in different countries, we 
need to deflate foreign prices (see Arto et al., 2014). In this way we obtain the CBTA on 
avoided emissions    as:     
  
 
  
     . 
Following with our example, let us assume that EU fixes a domestic carbon tax 
rate t equal to 20 euro per tonne of CO2. Let us also assume that the emissions to produce 
tuna cans in the EU are equal to 5 tonnes of CO2 per thousand of euro produced. So, the 
carbon tax applied to EU tuna cans would be equal to 0.1 per monetary unit (a 10% tax). 
If the EU tuna can price      
   is 10 euro, the tax applied to each tuna can is 1 euro. A 
CBTA on avoided emissions applies to foreign products the same fiscal treatment as to 
domestic products. Following with the example, it means to impose a tariff equal to 1 
euro on each tuna can imported from abroad. Anyway, if the Taiwanese tuna can price 
     
    is 5 euro, the tariff per monetary unit is 0.2 instead of 0.1. In general terms, we 
apply a deflator per each product and each foreign country to express tariffs per monetary 
units.  
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3. Data description 
The analysis requires information from two databases: WIOD database, available 
since April 2012 and updated in November 2013 (WIOD, 2013), and COMEXT database 
made available by Eurostat (Eurostat, 2015).  
From WIOD database we use multi-regional symmetrical input-output table, 
international supply and use tables, and CO2 emissions data. We use the multi-regional 
symmetrical input-output table at current prices for the year 2009.
7
 This industry by 
industry table offers information in monetary terms (millions of dollars) on 41 countries 
(27 European counties, 13 other major countries in the world and all the remaining 
regions aggregated in a single “rest of the world” region), and 35 sectors. This table is 
needed to compute emissions embodied in foreign products in the ee-MRIO model. 
Second, we use the international supply and use tables for the same year to compute 
avoided emissions applying the ee-IO model. In this case we aggregate the 27 European 
countries in one single region, the EU, using the information from the other 14 countries 
to know the intermediate imports disaggregated by sector. We also use the international 
supply and use tables to get information desegregated by product and compute the 
matrices  and   . The information is available for 59 CPA products. For CO2 emissions 
data, we employ the environmental accounts always from WIOD. This satellite accounts 
have the same sector breakdown (35 sectors) and geographical coverage (41 countries) as 
the world IO tables. In particular, from the air emission accounts, we use data on CO2 
emissions (in 1000 tonnes) desegregated by sector. 
From COMEXT database we use data on international trade, recorded following 
the 2002 CPA classification. COMEXT database contains statistics on trade among EU 
countries and between EU member states and global partners. Data are available for 283 
trading partners and 881 products categories, and they are expressed in monetary terms 
(euro) as well as in physical term (kilograms). In particular, we use the information on the 
14 non-EU countries available in WIOD, and information on 217 products
8 
in order to 
calculate the deflators and to obtain CBTA on avoided emissions.
9
 
 
 
4. Results 
In this paper we consider the EU as a single region. Assuming that the EU has a 
domestic carbon tax, we simulate a hypothetical CBTA that the EU would apply on 
products imported from non-EU countries in order to “level the field”. We use 2009 as 
the reference year. 
                                                          
7
 See the thesis Appendix I for a detailed description of WIOD database. 
8
 See Appendix A for a complete list of the 217 products used from COMEXT. 
9 
Appendix B explains in detail how deflators are computed. It also shows the importance of using 
the highest data desegregation available, in order to avoid biases in the deflators obtained. 
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In the simulation, first, we assume that the EU has a domestic carbon tax equal to 
20 euro per ton of CO2 emitted applied to all sectors. This tax level is realistic since, in 
fact, it was the tax rate proposed, but not approved, by the European Commission to 
reform the European Energy Tax Directive (European Commission 2011, Rocchi et al. 
2014). Although we set the carbon taxation at a specific value to interpret results more 
easily, the analysis could be expressed in a general form for any tax level t.
10
 Second, we 
assume that non-EU countries are not implementing any emission reduction policy.
11
 
Finally, we assume that the EU applies a CBTA on products imported from non-EU 
countries to compensate for the domestic carbon tax, without considering further 
emission reduction policies the EU could be implementing. 
The CBTA rates are calculated by product. Although WIOD data are 
disaggregated in 59 different categories, we focus our analysis only on 22 manufactured 
products.
12
 We exclude services because CBTA is a system of customs duties applied to 
products physically imported. Regarding agricultural products and raw material, the EU 
does not likely have all the resources to produce domestically all agricultural products 
and raw material. Instead, it imports some goods that it does not produce. The 
disaggregation available in data does not permit to distinguish between products that the 
EU is importing but also producing domestically from that products that the EU does not 
have and, therefore, it needs to import from abroad. Since CBTA tariffs would be 
imposed on products that have an equivalent good produced domestically to level out 
different fiscal treatments applied to domestic and foreign goods, we exclude agricultural 
products and raw material from the analysis. 
The structure of this section is as follows. In section 4.1 we compare at a global 
level the CBTA system computed following the two methods proposed: rates based on 
embodied emission and rates based on avoided emissions. Then, we present the analysis 
at a product level and at a country level in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 respectively. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Since tax rates are a linear transformation of the emission content of each product, rates in a 
general form can be obtained multiplying the results obtained times t/20. Anyway, other duties 
would not change the comparison between countries and sectors found. 
11
 If foreign countries already apply carbon policies, some compensation should be applied. 
Moreover, literature suggeststhat in a CBTA system the abating regions could also exempt their 
export from the domestic carbon taxation, in order to avoid the competitive disadvantage of 
domestic firm in the world market (Holzer, 2010). Anyway, this policy option is out of the scope 
of our analysis.  
12
 Rates shown in this analysis are average tariffs, assuming a unique homogeneous good for each 
WIOD classification. Each WIOD category aggregates a wide variety of products. Reason why, 
starting from the results found in this analysis, a possible extension of this work could be a more 
desegregated analysis focused on the products that would be charged most under a CBTA scheme. 
Anyway, this is not possible with WIOD data that instead permits a multi-regional analysis.  
11 
 
4.1. CBTA on embodied emissions and CBTA on avoided emissions 
Table 1 shows CBTA rates by product, comparing rates computed on embodied 
emissions (white columns) and rates computed on avoided emissions (grey columns) for 
each non-EU country. Rates are computed per monetary unit imported. So, tax rates on 
embodied emissions vary by country because each country has a different technology and 
a different price for each product. Although emissions avoided by the EU when it imports 
a product are the same independently of what country the product is imported from, also 
tax rates computed considering avoided emissions vary among countries due to 
international differences in prices. 
To give a first overall picture, we compare the two different tax designs 
considering all the products and all the countries. Results in aggregate terms are displayed 
in Figure 1 in which we distinguish products that would be more strongly affected 
through tariffs higher than 2%, products that would be mildly affected (with tariffs 
between 1% and 2%), and products less affected (with tariffs lower than 1%). As 
expected, CBTA tariffs would be higher in a system based on embodied emissions 
(Figure 1.a) in which rates would be more than 2% for 41% of the totality of the 308 
products considered (22 products for each of the 14 countries), more than twice as much 
as the products heavily taxed in a system calculated on avoided emissions. A similar 
number of products would be mildly affected (42% and 32% respectively) under the two 
systems, while much more products would pay low tariffs under a system based on 
avoided emissions.
13
 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of products based on their tariff size, under the two different CBTA 
designs 
 
 
a. Embodied emissions                          b. Avoided emissions 
 (adjusted for price differences) 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
                                                          
13 
Appendix D  provides a similar comparison of the results obtained for a system based on 
avoided emissions, considering data in monetary terms without price adjustment, or deflating data 
to take into account international differences in prices; the comparison shows the bias in the results 
that would result when international price differences are not considered.
 
17% 
42% 
41% 
52% 
32% 
16% 
 tariff < 1% 
1%< tariff <2% 
 tariff >2% 
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Table 1.  Tariffs on embodied emissions and tariffs on avoided emissions, in percentage,  by product and by country, 2009 
    AUS BRA CAN CHN IDN IND JPN 
    
Embodied 
emissions 
Avoided 
emissions 
Embodied 
emissions 
Avoided 
emissions 
Embodied 
emissions 
Avoided 
emissions 
Embodied 
emissions 
Avoided 
emissions 
Embodied 
emissions 
Avoided 
emissions 
Embodied 
emissions 
Avoided 
emissions 
Embodied 
emissions 
Avoided 
emissions 
15 Food products and beverages 1.1 1.0 0.7 1.6 1.0 0.5 2.0 0.6 0.9 1.8 3.7 0.8 0.6 0.3 
16 Tobacco products 1.1 0.8 0.7 2.3 1.0 0.4 2.0 0.5 0.9 3.8 3.7 3.0 0.6 1.4 
17 Textiles 1.2 0.7 0.6 1.2 1.2 1.5 2.8 2.1 3.8 2.5 3.8 1.6 0.8 0.5 
18 Wearing apparel 1.1 0.7 0.6 1.0 1.0 0.4 2.8 1.5 3.8 1.0 3.8 1.4 0.8 0.2 
19 Leather and leather products 1.1 1.8 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 2.1 2.6 1.8 1.0 2.3 1.1 0.7 0.3 
20 Wood and products of wood and cork  1.2 0.8 0.5 0.8 1.1 0.9 2.9 0.9 1.6 0.6 5.1 0.7 0.9 0.2 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.1 0.7 3.9 0.5 2.8 0.6 5.3 0.6 0.9 0.1 
22 Printed matter and recorded media 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.5 1.0 0.4 3.9 1.9 2.8 2.6 5.3 2.3 0.9 0.3 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products  2.1 10.2 1.4 2.8 3.4 3.2 5.1 1.2 1.6 1.7 4.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 
24 Chemicals, chemical products  2.0 1.0 1.1 3.5 2.2 1.3 5.5 2.5 2.2 8.1 5.1 2.4 1.6 0.4 
25 Rubber and plastic products 1.5 0.5 0.8 0.7 1.2 0.8 4.2 1.4 2.1 1.1 4.5 1.3 1.1 0.4 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 4.1 1.4 3.2 3.6 2.9 4.4 10.1 7.6 12.3 6.1 12.9 4.7 3.7 0.7 
27 Basic metals 2.2 0.5 1.6 1.1 2.0 0.3 6.4 1.7 6.7 0.5 8.3 1.7 1.9 0.6 
28 Fabricated metal products 2.6 1.0 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.1 6.2 3.2 6.7 2.3 7.8 3.0 1.9 0.9 
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1.7 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.1 0.4 4.0 1.7 1.5 1.3 4.5 1.4 0.9 0.5 
30 Office machinery and computers 0.9 0.2 0.8 0.4 1.0 0.3 3.3 0.7 0.0 1.4 3.8 1.1 0.9 0.3 
31 Electrical machinery  1.3 0.2 0.8 1.3 1.0 0.2 3.3 1.2 1.8 1.0 4.2 1.3 0.9 0.3 
32 Radio, television and comm. eq. 1.4 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.0 0.4 3.3 1.4 1.8 0.7 3.8 2.2 0.9 0.7 
33 Medical and optical instruments 1.3 0.3 0.8 1.2 1.0 0.5 3.3 4.2 1.8 0.8 4.0 1.9 0.9 0.5 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers  1.2 0.4 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.6 3.3 1.6 1.3 0.8 4.1 0.9 0.9 0.5 
35 Other transport equipment 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.9 3.3 1.1 1.3 2.2 4.5 1.5 0.9 0.6 
36 Furniture; other manufactured goods  1.3 0.2 0.6 8.7 1.0 0.4 3.3 1.6 2.1 1.6 2.9 0.9 1.0 0.4 
Source: own elaboration.  
Non-EU countries: AUS: Australia; BRA: Brazil; CAN: Canada; CHN: China; IDN: Indonesia; IND: India; JPN: Japan; KOR: Korea; MEX: Mexico; RUS: Russia; TUR: 
Turkey; TWN: Taiwan; USA: United States; ROW: Rest of the World. 
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Table 1. (Continuation) Tariffs on embodied emissions and tariffs on avoided emissions, in percentage,  by product and by country, 2009 
  KOR MEX RUS TUR TWN USA ROW 
  
Embodied 
emissions 
Avoided 
emissions 
Embodied 
emissions 
Avoided 
emissions 
Embodied 
emissions 
Avoided 
emissions 
Embodied 
emissions 
Avoided 
emissions 
Embodied 
emissions 
Avoided 
emissions 
Embodied 
emissions 
Avoided 
emissions 
Embodied 
emissions 
Avoided 
emissions 
15 Food products and beverages 1.6 0.5 1.1 0.8 2.2 1.7 1.2 0.7 1.5 1.2 1.4 0.9 1.3 1.0 
16 Tobacco products 1.6 1.0 1.1 0.5 2.2 1.0 1.2 0.7 1.5 0.8 1.4 0.9 1.3 2.2 
17 Textiles 2.1 1.3 1.6 1.2 2.6 2.0 1.1 1.4 2.7 1.5 1.5 0.8 1.7 2.0 
18 Wearing apparel 2.1 1.4 1.6 0.6 2.6 0.8 1.1 0.9 2.7 1.7 1.4 0.7 1.6 1.3 
19 Leather and leather products 1.6 0.7 1.1 0.8 2.7 1.4 0.9 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.1 
20 Wood and products of wood and cork 1.9 0.3 1.4 0.3 3.3 1.3 2.2 0.6 1.5 0.4 1.8 0.6 1.5 0.9 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 2.1 0.5 1.4 0.7 3.1 0.7 1.3 0.8 2.6 0.3 1.3 0.5 1.5 0.7 
22 Printed matter and recorded media 2.1 1.5 1.4 0.3 3.1 0.7 1.3 1.5 2.6 0.8 1.1 0.5 1.5 1.2 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products 2.6 1.8 3.2 16.8 5.4 2.0 2.5 1.6 3.4 1.9 2.3 2.9 3.5 2.0 
24 Chemicals, chemical products 2.7 2.2 1.7 2.3 9.5 3.3 1.4 2.6 3.8 1.6 1.9 0.8 3.4 1.5 
25 Rubber and plastic products 2.1 0.8 1.6 0.6 4.5 0.7 1.9 1.0 2.3 0.9 1.4 0.4 8.0 1.0 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 7.4 1.6 5.2 3.3 12.8 7.8 7.4 4.9 12.3 4.2 4.9 1.3 7.1 6.4 
27 Basic metals 4.1 0.9 2.3 1.2 10.3 1.3 2.7 2.0 4.2 1.3 1.9 0.9 2.8 0.7 
28 Fabricated metal products 4.1 2.2 2.2 1.4 10.3 3.0 2.5 2.6 4.2 2.9 1.9 0.7 2.8 1.5 
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1.9 1.1 1.3 0.7 4.5 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.1 1.0 0.5 1.9 0.6 
30 Office machinery and computers 1.7 0.3 1.6 0.3 4.3 0.3 0.9 0.6 1.7 0.4 0.7 0.4 1.9 0.4 
31 Electrical machinery 1.7 0.6 1.6 0.4 4.3 1.1 2.3 1.2 1.7 0.5 0.7 0.2 2.0 0.6 
32 Radio, television and comm. eq. 1.7 0.5 1.6 0.4 4.3 0.8 1.2 1.0 1.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.9 1.1 
33 Medical and optical instruments 1.7 1.3 1.6 0.8 4.3 0.2 1.2 3.1 1.7 1.6 0.7 0.4 2.2 0.5 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers 1.8 0.9 1.1 0.6 3.4 1.0 1.2 0.7 1.7 0.9 1.1 0.5 1.5 0.8 
35 Other transport equipment 1.8 0.2 1.1 1.6 3.4 3.1 1.3 0.8 1.7 0.9 1.1 0.8 1.5 0.4 
36 Furniture; other manufactured goods 1.9 1.0 1.7 1.2 4.1 0.7 1.5 1.2 1.9 1.2 0.9 0.7 4.2 1.1 
Source: own elaboration.  
Non-EU countries: AUS: Australia; BRA: Brazil; CAN: Canada; CHN: China; IDN: Indonesia; IND: India; JPN: Japan; KOR: Korea; MEX: Mexico; RUS: Russia; TUR: 
Turkey; TWN: Taiwan; USA: United States; ROW: Rest of the World. 
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4.2. Analysis at the product level 
In this Section we analyze the results from the two CBTA systems: on embodied emissions 
and on avoided emissions. For each system we measure the impact first considering only the tax rates 
applied to different products and then taking into account also trade volume of each product. 
CBTA on embodied emissions 
If we look at the tariffs obtained under a system based on embodied emissions, the products 
mostly affected would be “Other non-metallic mineral products” (26).14 For these products, the 
average rate would be higher than 2% in all the 14 non-EU countries, being particularly high (more 
than 10%) for products imported by China (10.1%), Indonesia (12.3%), India (12.9%), Russia 
(12.8%), and Taiwan (12.3%). These products are the ones whose emissions depend most on exporting 
countries’ technologies: for all the countries considered except for Canada the emissions produced by 
each country are at least the 90% of embodied emissions. Anyway, in different countries emissions 
come from different production phases. In Indonesia and India these emissions are largely produced 
by the sector producing “other non-metallic mineral products”. In China and Russia an important share 
of emissions (32.1% and 32.8%) are embodied in the electricity need to produce them. In Taiwan, one 
fifth of embodied emissions come instead from the extraction of raw material. 
Other products that would be particularly affected are “Basic metals” (27), and “Fabricated 
metal products” (28). For these products, rates would be high in particular for Russia (10.3% in both 
cases), India (8.2% and 7.4%), Indonesia (6.7% in both cases), and China (6.3% and 6.2%). China, 
India, Russia and Taiwan would also have the highest rates on other energy-intensive products as 
“Coke, refined petroleum products” (23) and  “Chemicals, chemical products” (24). For all these 
products, the analysis reveals a pattern of embodied emissions very similar to the one described for 
“Other non-metallic mineral products”: on average roughly the 80% of embodied emissions are 
generated in the exporting country.  For “Basic metals” (27), and “Fabricated metal products” (28) 
produced in Russia and Indonesia emissions are mainly due to the intensive use of energy of the 
producing sectors; for Chinese and Indian products belonging to these classifications, and for “Coke, 
refined petroleum products” (23) or  “Chemical products” (24) from the countries listed before, 
roughly half of the emissions embodied are due to the electricity needed to produce them. Some of 
these products would also have rates higher than 2% when imported from Australia, Canada, Korea, 
Mexico, Turkey and USA, but in this case the contribution to emissions of the electricity sector would 
be much lower. 
There are finally other products that would be taxed most, but just when produced and 
imported by few countries, in particular China, India, and Russia. For these three countries, many 
products would be taxed with rates higher than 3%: “Wood and products of wood and cork” (20), 
“Pulp, paper and paper products” (21), “Printed matter and recorded media” (22), “Machinery and 
equipment” (29), “Office machinery and computers” (30), “Electrical machinery” (31), “Radio, 
television, and communication equipment” (32), “Medical and optical instruments” (33), “Motor 
vehicles, trailers” (34), “Other transport equipment” (35). Once again, what these three countries have 
in common is that for all these products more than 90% of embodied emissions are generated in the 
exporting country; they also have in common a relevant role of the electricity sector in creating the 
emissions embodied in these products: for these products, on average, 47% of embodied emissions are 
due to the electricity sector. 
                                                          
14
 The number in parenthesis after a product’s name refers to the product’s number in Table 1. 
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So, to conclude, looking at tax rates at a product level, the main products affected would be 
the energy-intensive products, in particular when imported from China, Indonesia, India, Russia, 
Korea, and Taiwan; the many emissions embodied in energy-intensive products coming from these 
countries are clearly related to the technology needed to produce them, but also, especially for China, 
India, and Russia, to the highly polluting electricity sector. 
Comparing the results obtained simulating CBTA on avoided emissions with the previous 
results, two main characteristics are worth being noticed. 
First, the emissions the EU is avoiding, or in other terms the emissions that the EU would have 
produced if all products were made domestically, are on average very few. This implies that in general 
a system based on avoided emissions implies tariffs lower than in a system based on embodied 
emissions: only for 15% of the products analyzed (42 out of 308) a system based on avoided emissions 
would imply rates higher than a system based on embodied emissions. 
Second, analyzing the 15% of goods that would be more affected by a system based on 
avoided emissions, products that would be taxed more are “Tobacco products” (16) imported from 
Brazil, Indonesia and Japan; “Textiles” (17) from Brazil, Indonesia and Turkey; “Leather products” 
(19) from Austria, Canada, and Turkey; and “Chemical products” (24) imported from Brazil, 
Indonesia, and Turkey. This means that if these specific products were entirely produced in the EU, 
they would produce a bigger amount of emissions. These results also shows that CBTA based on 
avoided emissions would be higher than CBTA on embodied emissions mainly in three countries: 
Brazil, Indonesia, and Turkey. 
Tax rates applied to different products provide a measure of the impact that CBTA would 
have. Anyway, its effect would depend also on the total value of goods imported in the EU: a very 
high tax on basic metals imported from India might be insignificant if India trades just very few units 
with the EU. Taking into account also trade volume reveals different information.
15
 Figure 2 shows the 
20 products, over the 308 analyzed, mostly affected by a CBTA system based on embodied emissions: 
these products would indeed bear more than the 60% of the total effect of the policy, represented by 
the width of each bubble, computed as the tax rates (shown in the horizontal axis) multiplied by the 
total value imported in the EU (shown in the vertical axis).
16
 The main result that Figure 2 shows is 
that 14 out of 20 products would be imported from China that alone would sustain roughly 30% of the 
policy’s effect. The ranking of these products seems to be more related with the volume of trade than 
the severity of the rates imposed: the three most affected products, for example, would not be energy-
intensive products, but “Radio, television, and communication equipments” (32), “Office machinery 
and computers” (30), and “Textiles” (17).  
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 Although the volume of goods imported would clearly change following the CBTA implementation, we 
propose a static quantification of the policy effect to take into account the actual size of trade flows.  
16
 The region that would actually bear the most part of a CBTA system is the region “Rest of the World” (RoW) 
that would pay roughly the 40% of the policy’s cost. Anyway, we do not analyse this region in detail because it 
aggregates several and different countries, and it would not be possible to provide a more detailed explanation to 
the results found. 
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Figure 2. 20 products most affected by a CBTA system based on embodied emissions. 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
Another interesting result is that two of the mostly affected products come from USA: 
“Chemical products” (24) would be the 5th most affected product, “Other transport equipment” (35) 
the 13
th
. Also in this case it is due more to the volume of trade than to high tariffs (respectively 1.9% 
and 1.1%). Conversely, very high tax rates more than the trade volume explain the cost the reform 
would imply on Russian products classified “Coke, refined petroleum products” (23),  and “Basic 
metals” (27). 
Also for the CBTA based on avoided emissions we show, besides tariffs obtained, the effect of 
CBTA considering both the tax rates obtained and the volume of trade (Figure 3). Although the impact 
in absolute terms would be different, the ranking of the most affected products would change only 
partially. The reason is that, as previously described, the policy impact relies more on the volume of 
trade than on the severity of the tariffs imposed. Anyway, for some products, the two systems would 
imply a strongly different impact. This would be the case of “Basic metals” (27) produced in Russia, 
which under a system based on embodied emissions would be the 4
th
 category mostly affected bearing 
the 4.4% of the total policy impact, and under a system based on avoided emissions it would bear the 
1.1% of the total impact instead. Another example would be Chinese “Medical and optical 
instruments” (33) that would sustain only the 1.6% of total effect in the first scenario analyzed and the 
4.6% in the second one. 
In the next Section we focus more in deep on specific countries to show the overall effect of 
the two tax designs for any of them. 
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Figure 3. 20 products most affected by a CBTA system based on avoided emissions. 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
4.3. Analysis at the country level 
Looking at the tax rates, differences between the two systems can also be found at a country 
level with important differences across them (see Figure 4). In Figure 4.a countries are ordered based 
on the spreading of the CBTA on embodied emissions; and in Figure 4.b the equivalent for the CBTA 
on avoided emissions. For each country the label also shows, in parenthesis, the average tariff 
applied.
17
 For three countries, China, India, and Russia, the differences between the two approaches 
would be very strong. Considering embodied emissions, 100% of their products would be charged 
with tariffs higher than 2%, and the average tariff would be, respectively, 3.9%, 4.9%, and 4.9%. 
Considering avoided emissions only 27% of products would be mostly affected, and the average tariffs 
would be 1.9%, 1.7%, and 1.6%. 
Although in a less decisive way, also for almost all the other countries a CBTA system based 
on embodied emissions would have a stronger impact than a CBTA based on avoided emissions for 
both the level of the rates and their spread across products. The difference is less strong for Turkey, 
USA, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, and Australia. Brazil is the country that performs differently from the 
rest of the regions: in this case a tariff system based on avoided emissions would be worse than a 
system based on embodied emissions. In particular, 16 products (73%) would be taxed more under a 
system designed on avoided emissions.  
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 The averages in Figure 4 are computed as simple averages without taking into account trade volumes. 
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Figure 4. Percentage of products based on their tariff size, by country, under the two different CBTA 
designs 
 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
Finally, also at a county level, it is interesting to show the effect of the two different CBTA 
systems in terms of the cost that they would imply. To do so, in Table 2 we express the impact of the 
policy for each non-EU country in three different ways. 
First, we show weighted rates that represent the impact as a percentage of the total value of 
manufactures that any non-EU country exports to the EU (first two columns of Table 2). So, for 
example, for Australia the total impact of a system based on embodied emissions would represent the 
1.6% of the value of manufactures that the country exports to the EU. As found before, under a system 
based on embodied emissions the three most affected countries are Russia, India, and China. For these 
countries the policy would imply an impact equal to, respectively, 7.2%, 4.0%, and 3.6% of the value 
of manufactures exported to the EU. The ranking changes under a system based on avoided emissions. 
In this case Indonesia would be the most affected country, paying the 1.9% of the value of 
manufactures exported to the EU. 
The result is different when we measure the impact as a percentage of the total trade value that 
each non-EU country exports to the EU (columns 3 and 4 of Table 2). The main change regards 
Russia. Being raw material the most important trade flow with the EU, the cost of CBTA based on 
embodied (avoided) emissions would be only the 1.8% (0.4%) of the total value imported from Russia. 
The last two columns of Figure 2 show what share of the policy impact each country would 
bear. An interesting result regards USA:  although a CBTA on embodied (avoided) emissions would 
represent only the 1.3% (0.8%) of the manufactures’ value imported from USA, and the 0.6% (0.4%) 
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of the total value imported, USA would be the third country in terms of share of the policy cost, 
bearing the 7.5% (8.8%) of the total cost of the policy. This is due to the fact that the volume of trade 
between USA and the EU is very large. 
 
Table 2. CBTA cost for each non-EU country 
Non-EU 
Country 
Percentage of the value of 
manufactures exported by any 
non-EU to the EU 
Percentage of total trade value 
exported by any non-EU to the 
EU 
Country’s share of the policy 
cost 
Embodied 
emissions 
Avoided 
emission 
Embodied 
emissions 
Avoided 
emission 
Embodied 
emissions 
Avoided 
emission  
Australia 1.6 [9]
 *
 1.1 [8] 0.5 [13] 0.3 [12] 0.3 [14] 0.5 [14] 
Brazil 0.8 [14] 1.7 [4] 0.3 [14] 0.7 [7] 0.6 [12] 2.4 [9] 
Canada 1.5 [11] 0.9 [10] 0.5 [12] 0.3 [13] 0.7 [11] 0.9 [12] 
China 3.6 [3] 1.7 [3] 2.9 [1] 1.4 [1] 29.6 [2] 29.1 [2] 
Indonesia 2.1 [6] 1.9 [1] 1 [8] 0.9 [3] 0.8 [10] 1.5 [11] 
India 4 [2] 1.4 [5] 2.2 [2] 0.8 [5] 5.3 [5] 3.9 [5] 
Japan 1.1 [13] 0.6 [14] 0.9 [9] 0.5 [9] 2.4 [8] 2.6 [7] 
Korea 2 [7] 0.7 [13] 1.6 [4] 0.6 [8] 3.5 [6] 2.4 [8] 
Mexico 1.5 [10] 0.8 [11] 0.5 [11] 0.3 [14] 0.4 [13] 0.5 [13] 
Russia 7.2 [1] 1.8 [2] 1.4 [5] 0.4 [11] 5.7 [4] 2.9 [6] 
Turkey 1.7 [8] 1.4 [6] 1.3 [7] 1 [2] 3 [7] 4.9 [4] 
Taiwan 2.3 [5] 1.1 [9] 1.8 [3] 0.9 [4] 1.6 [9] 1.6 [10] 
USA 1.3 [12] 0.8 [12] 0.6 [10] 0.4 [10] 7.5 [3] 8.8 [3] 
RoW 2.6 [4] 1.3 [7] 1.4 [6] 0.7 [6] 38.5 [1] 38 [1] 
Source: own elaboration. 
*
Countries ranking: [1] is the most affected country, [14] is the less affected. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed CBTA. This policy is designed to avoid one of the drawbacks of 
emission control instrument applied only on domestic products. It consists in tariffs on imports that 
level out different treatments on domestic and foreign products that compete in the same market. In 
particular, we have analyzed the metric of CBTA, one of the topics of the debate. We have assumed a 
20 euro CO2 tax applied in the EU, and we have simulated two different possible CBTA systems. The 
first is based on emissions embodied in imports. The second is based on emissions the EU would 
produce to make the same product integrally within its borders, which is on avoided emissions. 
Looking at the main results, the two mechanisms would imply a different outcome in 
aggregate terms. In fact, a system designed considering embodied emissions would cost 2.5% of the 
total value of manufactures imported in the EU from the non-EU countries (a 1.3% under a system 
based on avoided emissions). This result is in line with the findings of the existing literature. The 
difference between the two methods varies depending on the countries considered. For some countries 
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(Australia, Indonesia, Japan, and USA) the rates computed under the two systems would be similar, 
while for other countries (such as China, India, or Russia) the difference would be really high.  
On the one hand a possible conclusion could be that a system based on avoided emissions is 
likely to be more acceptable due to its lower cost and due to the fact that products would not be 
differently treated depending on their origin.  
On the other hand the analysis also makes it clear that a system based on avoided emissions 
would not be targeted at the real pollution content of the different goods. This conclusion is 
exemplified by the case of Brazil. Under a system based on avoided emissions Brazilian products 
would be taxed more than under a system that takes into account the emissions actually contained in 
them. This is due to the fact that, for this country, the average content of emissions is limited 
especially thanks to an ex electricity production system with low carbon content. A system based on 
avoided emissions should take into account cases such as Brazil. Otherwise it would create a 
disincentive for emission control, and it would go in the opposite direction of a policy, such as a 
carbon tax, which seeks to create incentives to reduce emissions.  
The analysis also shows that, under both metrics, China would largely be the main target 
country of an EU CBTA system. This is caused by its highly polluting production system and 
electricity sector. It is also due to the volume of trade that exists between the EU and China. 
Moreover, given its crucial role in international trade relations, Chinese production system is also 
responsible for an important share of emissions embodied in products, especially electronic ones, 
produced by other countries. Based on this result, the prospect that the EU implements a CBTA 
system could serve as political leverage in reaching an international agreement after Kyoto.
18
  
In terms of analysis by products, two groups of goods would be most affected. On the one 
hand there are energy intensive products such as coke, refined petroleum products, chemicals, 
chemical products, other non-metallic mineral products, basic metals, and fabricated metal products. 
Also this result is in line with the existing literature. On the other hand the analysis reveals that also 
electronic products, such as radios, televisions, and office machineries, would be highly exposed to 
CBTA due to the large volume traded with the EU. China, India, and Russia would be the most 
affected countries. When the volume of trade is considered, China assumes a predominant role. Also 
USA would bear an important share of the CBTA cost under both designs, although the policy’s cost 
would represent less than the 2% of the manufactures the country exports to the EU. The results at a 
product level might suggest another element in the debate on the metric of CBTA. The impact of the 
policy would fall largely on two groups of products for different reasons. Energy-intensive products 
are among the most affected goods due to their carbon content. Non-energy intensive products, such as 
electronics, would also be strongly affected due to the large volume traded in the EU. So an alternative 
solution to the higher impact of a CBTA based on embodied emissions could be to limit the tariff 
system only to certain products. This would also facilitate practical implementation of CBTA. In fact, 
it reduces the amount of information needed. A possible criterion to select products could consider the 
most exposed to the risk of leakage. This suggests the need of further analysis at a product level on 
what products could suffer of carbon leakage most. 
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 Tariffs on imported goods have also been proposed in environmental policy as a measure to penalize countries 
that do not enter agreements on global problems such as climate change. Since this use of carbon tariffs does not 
necessarily imply tax on carbon emissions, some authors suggest that it would be easier to apply a general 
sanction tariff equal for all the goods imported from countries that do not enter the climate club (Nordhaus, 
2015).  
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6. Appendices 
Appendix A. COMEXT products considered 
Num. COMEXT code, Product  Num. COMEXT code, Product  
1 1511 fresh and preserved meat (except poultry) 45 1810 leather clothes 
2 1512 fresh and preserved poultry meat 46 1821 work wear 
3 1513 meat and poultry meat products 47 1822 outerwear 
4 1520 processed and preserved fish and fish products 48 1823 underwear 
5 1531 processed and preserved potatoes 49 1824 other wearing apparel and accessories n.e.c. 
6 1532 fruit and vegetable juices 50 1830 furs; articles of fur 
7 1533 processed and preserved fruit and vegetables n.e.c 51 1910 leather 
8 1541 crude oil and fats 52 1920 luggage, handbags and the like; saddlery and harness 
9 1542 refined oils and fats 53 1930 footwear 
10 1543 margarine and similar edible fats 54 2010 wood, sawn, planed or impregnated 
11 1551 dairy products 55 
2020 veneer sheets; plywood, laminboard, particle board, fibre 
board and other panels and boards 
12 1552 ice cream and other edible ice 56 2030 builders' joinery and carpentry, of wood 
13 1561 grain mill products 57 2040 wooden containers 
14 1562 starches and starch products 58 2051 other products of wood 
15 1571 prepared animal feeds for farm animals 59 2052 articles of cork, straw and plaiting 
16 1572 prepared pet food 60 2111 pulp 
17 1581 bread, fresh pastry goods and cakes 61 2112 paper and paperboard 
18 1582 rusks and biscuits; preserved pastry goods and cakes 62 
2121 corrugated paper and paperboard and containers of paper 
and paperboard 
19 1583 sugar 63 2122 household and toilet paper and paper products 
20 1584 cocoa; chocolate and sugar confectionery 64 2123 paper stationery 
21 
1585 macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar farinaceous 
products 65 2124 wallpaper 
22 1586 coffee and tea 66 2125 other articles of paper and paperboard n.e.c. 
23 1587 condiments and seasonings 67 2211 books 
24 1588 homogenised food preparations and dietetic food 68 
2212 newspapers, journals and periodicals, appearing at least 
four times a week 
25 1589 other food products 69 
2213 newspapers, journals and periodicals, appearing less than 
four times a week 
26 1591 distilled alcoholic beverages 70 2214 sound recordings 
27 1592 ethyl alcohol 71 
2215 postcards, greeting cards, pictures and other printed 
matter 
28 1593 wines 72 2222 printing services n.e.c. 
29 1594 cider and other fruit wines 73 2224 composition and plate-making services 
30 1595 other non-distilled fermented beverages 74 2310 coke oven products 
31 1596 beer made from malt 75 2320 refined petroleum products 
32 1597 malt 76 2330 nuclear fuel 
33 1598 mineral waters and soft drinks 77 2411 industrial gases 
34 1600 tobacco products 78 2412 dyes and pigments 
35 1710 textile yarn and thread 79 2413 other basic inorganic chemicals 
36 1720 textile fabrics 80 2414 other basic organic chemicals 
37 1740 made-up textile articles, except apparel 81 2415 fertilizers and nitrogen compounds 
38 1751 carpets and rugs 82 2416 plastics in primary forms 
39 1752 cordage, rope, twine and netting 83 2417 synthetic rubber in primary forms 
40 
1753 nonwovens and articles made from nonwovens, except 
apparel 84 2420 pesticides and other agro-chemical products 
41 1754 other textiles n.e.c. 85 
2430 paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and 
mastics 
42 1760 knitted or crocheted fabrics 86 2441 basic pharmaceutical products 
43 1771 knitted and crocheted hosiery 87 2442 pharmaceutical preparations 
44 
1772 knitted and crocheted pullovers, cardigans and similar 
articles 88 
2451 glycerol, soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing 
preparations 
 Source: own elaboration from COMEXT database. 
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Appendix A. (Continuation) COMEXT products considered 
Num. COMEXT code, Product  Num. COMEXT code, Product  
89 2452 perfumes and toilet preparations 137 2741 precious metals 
90 2461 explosives 138 2742 aluminium and aluminium products 
91 2462 glues and gelatines 139 2743 lead, zinc and tin and products thereof 
92 2463 essential oils 140 2744 copper products 
93 2464 photographic chemical material 141 2745 other non-ferrous metal products 
94 2465 prepared unrecorded media 142 2811 metal structures and parts of structures 
95 2466 other chemical products n.e.c. 143 2812 builders' carpentry and joinery of metal 
96 2470 man-made fibres 144 2821 tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal 
97 2511 rubber tyres and tubes 145 2822 central heating radiators and boilers 
98 2512 retreaded pneumatic tyres, of rubber 146 2830 steam generators (except central heating hot 
99 2513 other rubber products 147 2861 cutlery 
100 2521 plastic plates, sheets, tubes and profiles 148 2862 tools 
101 2522 packaging products of plastics 149 2863 locks and hinges 
102 2523 builder's ware of plastic 150 2871 steel drums and similar containers 
103 2524 other plastic products 151 2872 light metal containers 
104 2611 flat glass 152 2873 wire products 
105 2612 shaped and processed flat glass 153 2874 fasteners, screw machine products, chain and springs 
106 2613 hollow glass 154 2875 other fabricated metal products n.e.c. 
107 2614 glass fibres 155 
2911 engines and turbines except aircraft, vehicle and cycle 
engines 
108 2615 other glass, processed, including technical glassware 156 2912 pumps and compressors 
109 2621 ceramic household and ornamental articles 157 2913 taps and valves 
110 2622 sanitary ceramic fixtures 158 2914 bearings, gears, gearing and driving elements 
111 2623 ceramic insulators and insulating fittings 159 2921 furnaces and furnace burners 
112 2624 technical ceramic wares 160 2922 lifting and handling equipment 
113 2625 ceramic articles n.e.c. 161 2923 non-domestic cooling and ventilation equipment 
114 2626 refractory ceramic goods 162 2924 other general purpose machinery n.e.c. 
115 2630 ceramic tiles and flags 163 2931 agricultural tractors 
116 2640 bricks, tiles and construction products, in baked clay 164 2932 other agricultural and forestry machinery 
117 2651 cement 165 2940 machine-tools 
118 2652 lime 166 2941 portable hand held power tools 
119 2653 plaster 167 2942 other metalworking machine tools 
120 2661 concrete products for construction purposes 168 2943 other machine tools n.e.c. 
121 2662 plaster products for construction purposes 169 2951 machinery for metallurgy 
122 2663 ready-mixed concrete 170 2952 machinery for mining, quarrying and construction 
123 2664 mortars 171 2953 machinery for food, beverage and tobacco processing 
124 2665 articles of fibre cement 172 2954 machinery for textile, apparel and leather  production 
125 2666 other articles of plaster, concrete or cement 173 2955 machinery for paper and paperboard production 
126 2670 monumental or building stone and articles thereof 174 2956 other special purpose machinery n.e.c. 
127 2681 abrasive products 175 2960 weapons and ammunition 
128 2682 other non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 176 2971 electric domestic appliances 
129 2710 basic iron and steel and ferro-alloys (ecsc) 177 2972 non-electric domestic appliances 
130 2721 tubes and tube fittings, of cast iron 178 3001 office machinery and parts thereof 
131 2722 steel tubes and steel tube fittings 179 3002 computers and other information processing equipment 
132 2731 cold drawn products 180 3110 electric motors, generators and transformers 
133 2732 cold-rolled of narrow strips 181 3120 electricity distribution and control apparatus 
134 
2733 cold formed or folded products of iron, non-alloy steel 
or stainless steel 182 3130 insulated wire and cable 
135 2734 wire 183 3140 accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 
136 2735 ferro-alloys (non-ecsc) and other iron and steel n.e.c. 184 3150 lighting equipment and electric lamps 
Source: own elaboration from COMEXT database. 
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Appendix A.  (Continuation) COMEXT products considered 
Prod. 
Num. 
COMEXT code, Product  
Prod. 
Num. 
COMEXT code, Product  
185 3161 electrical equipment for engines and vehicles n.e.c. 202 3542 bicycles 
186 3162 other electrical equipment n.e.c. 203 3543 invalid carriages 
187 
3210 electronic valves and tubes and other electronic 
components 204 3550 other transport equipment n.e.c. 
188 
3220 television and radio transmitters, apparatus for line 
telephony and telegraphy 205 3611 chairs and seats 
189 
3230 television and radio receivers, sound or video recording 
or reproducing apparatus and associated goods 206 3612 other office and shop furniture 
190 
3310 medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic 
appliances 207 3613 kitchen furniture 
191 
3320 instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, 
testing, navigating and other purposes 208 3614 other furniture 
192 3340 optical instruments and photographic equipment 209 3615 mattresses 
193 3350 watches and clocks 210 3621 coin and medals 
194 3410 motor vehicles 211 3622 jewellery and related articles n.e.c. 
195 
3420 bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; trailers and 
semi-trailers 212 3630 musical instruments 
196 
3430 parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their 
engines 213 3640 sports goods 
197 3511 ships 214 3650 games and toys 
198 3512 pleasure and sporting boats 215 3661 imitation jewellery 
199 
3520 railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock and 
parts thereof 216 3662 brooms and brushes 
200 3530 aircraft and spacecraft 217 3663 other manufactured goods n.e.c. 
201 3541 motorcycles   
Source: own elaboration from COMEXT database. 
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Appendix B. Computing deflators 
 
To compute tariffs based on avoided emissions the analysis has to consider that usually the same product 
produced in different countries has different prices. We consider the EU as a single region. We compute the 
emissions that EU would produce if it had produced domestically its imports, that is the avoided emissions. Once 
we obtain them, we need to apply a deflator for each product and each country to take into account international 
differences in prices. The deflator   
  of product k that the EU imports from country r is equal to the ratio 
between the domestic price of k in the EU and the price of the same good produced abroad and imported by the 
EU   
    
   
  , being s the EU. 
We obtain data on prices from the COMEXT database (Eurostat, 2015) that contains information on 
imports/exports to/from the EU in both monetary and physical terms. We obtain the prices of the imported 
product   
 . By dividing the value of a product imported in Europe from a foreign country over its quantity. 
Regarding the domestic price of the EU product   
  we compute the price of the products exported from EU, and 
we assume that the price of products exported from EU is the same as the domestic price of EU products, 
because data in physical terms are available only for international trade flows.  
By using data in monetary and physical terms from COMEXT, the prices obtained are the ones implicit in 
COMEXT database. Since the deflators are then applied to WIOD import data, we assume that prices in the two 
databases are the same.
19
 There are two reasons to use data in monetary and physical terms from COMEXT. 
First, it records imports in “Cost, Insurance and Freight” (CIF) prices and exports in “Free On Board” (FOB) 
prices. Since also WIOD uses CIF and FOB prices, assuming that prices are the same seems to be realistic. 
Second, using data in monetary terms from COMEXT has a further advantage since data are more disaggregated 
than in WIOD. We indeed use information of 217 COMEXT products to compute the deflator for the 22 WIOD 
products the analysis is focused on. 
Indeed using aggregated data could cause a bias in the deflators computed, just because the relative weight of 
different sub-products belonging to the same aggregate category is different. Let us consider a simplified 
numerical example, where EU exports and imports two different manufactured food products, yogurt and wine,  
with a non-EU country. Let us also assume that, while European yogurt exported is twice as expensive as the 
imported yogurt (Py
E
=4, Py
I
=2), the price of a bottle of wine is the same (Pw
E
 = Pw
I
 =10). Finally, let imagine that 
Europe exports 10 units of yogurt and 10 bottles of wine (Qy
E
=10, Qw
E
=10) and imports 50 units of yogurt and 
10 bottles of wine (Qy
I
=50, Qw
I
=10). The values of exported and imported goods are indeed: Vy
E
=40, Vw
E
=100, 
Vy
I
=100, Vw
I
=100. If data on values and quantities available are disaggregated, dividing the values over the 
quantities of yogurt and wine exported and imported we obtain the original prices, and the deflators obtained are 
equal to 2 for yogurt, 1 for wine. If data on values and quantities for the two products are instead aggregated 
(V
E
=140, V
I
=200, Q
E
=20, Q
I
=60), we would obtain a price for the unique good exported (P
E
=7) and a price for 
the unique product imported (P
I
=3.3) biased by the relative weight of each product, resulting in a deflator equal 
to 2.1, which would be greater than the highest deflator obtained with disaggregated data.  
So, to compute a deflator for each WIOD product, we compute prices of imports and exports with the highest 
disaggregation possible using COMEXT data, and then we aggregate in a single price for each WIOD category 
weighting the prices for the quantities imported. In the previous numerical example, we would obtain an 
“adjusted” aggregated price of export PEadjusted equal to 5, an “adjusted” aggregated price of import P
I
adjusted equal 
to 3.3, and a deflator equal to 1.5.
20
 Formally, adjusted prices are computed as: 
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19
 An alternative method can be to use data in monetary terms from WIOD. This implies finding directly the 
prices of the WIOD database, but assuming that the quantities recorded in the two databases are the same. 
20
 An alternative way would be, inversely, to adjust the import price for the quantities exported. We choose the 
first alternative because the deflators obtained are then applied to adjust products imported by Europe. 
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Appendix C. Deflators. 
 
 
 
 
    
AUS BRA CAN CHN IDN IND JPN KOR MX RUS TUR TWN USA ROW 
15 Food products and beverages 1.3 2.1 0.6 0.8 2.3 1.0 0.4 0.6 1.0 2.2 0.9 1.5 1.1 1.3 
16 Tobacco products* 1.0 3.0 0.6 0.7 4.9 3.8 1.8 1.3 0.6 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.1 2.9 
17 Textiles 1.0 1.7 2.1 3.0 3.7 2.4 0.7 1.8 1.7 2.9 2.1 2.2 1.2 2.9 
18 Wearing apparel 1.0 1.6 0.6 2.2 1.5 2.1 0.3 2.0 0.9 1.2 1.4 2.5 1.0 1.9 
19 Leather and leather products 3.5 1.8 1.9 5.3 2.1 2.2 0.5 1.3 1.6 2.9 2.4 2.8 2.1 2.1 
20 Wood and products of wood and cork  1.1 1.0 1.2 1.2 0.8 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 1.8 0.8 0.5 0.8 1.3 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.4 0.7 0.9 
22 Printed matter and recorded media 0.8 0.7 0.6 2.7 3.7 3.2 0.4 2.0 0.5 1.0 2.1 1.1 0.8 1.6 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products  5.3 1.4 1.6 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 8.7 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.5 1.0 
24 Chemicals, chemical products  0.9 3.2 1.2 2.3 7.4 2.2 0.4 2.0 2.1 3.0 2.4 1.5 0.8 1.4 
25 Rubber and plastic products 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.9 1.5 1.8 0.6 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.2 0.6 1.4 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.5 1.3 1.5 2.7 2.1 1.6 0.3 0.5 1.1 2.7 1.7 1.5 0.4 2.2 
27 Basic metals 0.4 0.9 0.2 1.4 0.4 1.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.6 1.1 0.7 0.6 
28 Fabricated metal products 0.8 1.6 0.9 2.6 1.9 2.5 0.8 1.8 1.2 2.5 2.1 2.3 0.5 1.2 
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.9 1.9 0.7 2.9 2.3 2.4 0.9 1.9 1.1 2.0 2.5 2.0 0.8 1.0 
30 Office machinery and computers 0.4 0.9 0.6 1.4 3.1 2.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.9 
31 Electrical machinery  0.4 2.4 0.4 2.2 2.0 2.4 0.6 1.2 0.8 2.0 2.2 0.9 0.4 1.1 
32 Radio, television and comm. eq. 1.4 2.7 0.7 2.9 1.5 4.5 1.5 1.1 0.8 1.7 2.2 1.4 1.3 2.2 
33 Medical and optical instruments 0.6 2.5 1.0 8.4 1.6 3.7 1.0 2.6 1.6 0.4 6.2 3.1 0.8 1.0 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers  0.7 1.2 1.0 2.7 1.4 1.6 0.9 1.5 1.0 1.7 1.2 1.5 0.9 1.3 
35 Other transport equipment 1.7 1.0 1.4 1.8 3.6 2.5 1.1 0.3 2.6 5.1 1.4 1.5 1.3 0.7 
36 Furniture; other manufactured goods  0.2 13.4 0.6 2.5 2.4 1.4 0.6 1.6 1.8 1.1 1.8 1.9 1.1 1.7 
Source: own elaboration on COMEXT and WIOD databases. 
Non-EU countries: AUS: Australia; BRA: Brazil; CAN: Canada; CHN: China; IDN: Indonesia; IND: India; JPN: Japan; KOR: Korea; MEX: Mexico; RUS: Russia;  
TUR: Turkey; TWN: Taiwan; USA: United States; ROW: Rest of the World. 
* The category “tobacco products” has been adjusted using additional more disaggregated data from the COMEXT database “EU Trade Since 1988 By SITC”, following the 
nomenclature correspondence provided by Eurostat in the database RAMON available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/relations/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LST_REL.  
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Appendix D. Tariffs on avoided emissions: monetary terms. 
 
 
Figure D1. Percentage of products based on their tariff size, with CBTA computed on avoided emission 
 
 
a. Avoided emissions 
(monetary) 
b. Avoided emissions 
 (adjusted for price differences) 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
In a CBTA system calculated on avoided emissions (Figure G1.a) among products that would be more 
strongly affected through tariffs higher than 2% would be 5%,  and products with tariffs between 1% and 
2%would be the 18%.. Adjusting for price differences (Figure A1.b) reveals that the most polluting products – 
or the products produced by the most polluting countries - are, on average, cheaper than European products, that 
implies that, after deflating data, the percentage of products strongly affected would be higher compared with the 
percentage found without adjusting for price differences (16% instead of 5%). Also mildly affected products, as 
the strongly affected ones, would be proportionally more when adjusting for price differences (32% instead of 
18%).  This result reveals that is necessary to take into account international price differences to avoid biased 
outcomes. 
 
77% 
18% 
5% 
52% 
32% 
16% 
 tariff < 1% 
1%< tariff <2% 
 tariff >2% 
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Table D1. CBTA by product for any non-EU country, in percentage, corresponding to a 20 euro/ CO2 tonne European carbon tax  
    
CBTA  
AE* 
 
CBTA 
AEd
** 
  
AUS BRA CAN CHN IDN IND JPN KOR MEX RUS TUR TWN USA ROW 
15 Food products and beverages 0.8 1.0 1.6 0.5 0.6 1.8 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.7 0.7 1.2 0.9 1.0 
16 Tobacco products 0.8 0.8 2.3 0.4 0.5 3.8 3.0 1.4 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.9 2.2 
17 Textiles 0.7 0.7 1.2 1.5 2.1 2.5 1.6 0.5 1.3 1.2 2.0 1.4 1.5 0.8 2.0 
18 Wearing apparel 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.4 1.5 1.0 1.4 0.2 1.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.7 0.7 1.3 
19 Leather and leather products 0.5 1.8 0.9 0.9 2.6 1.0 1.1 0.3 0.7 0.8 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.1 
20 Wood and products of wood and cork  0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.3 1.3 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.9 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.7 
22 Printed matter and recorded media 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 1.9 2.6 2.3 0.3 1.5 0.3 0.7 1.5 0.8 0.5 1.2 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products  1.9 10.2 2.8 3.2 1.2 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 16.8 2.0 1.6 1.9 2.9 2.0 
24 Chemicals, chemical products  1.1 1.0 3.5 1.3 2.5 8.1 2.4 0.4 2.2 2.3 3.3 2.6 1.6 0.8 1.5 
25 Rubber and plastic products 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.4 1.1 1.3 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.4 1.0 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 2.9 1.4 3.6 4.4 7.6 6.1 4.7 0.7 1.6 3.3 7.8 4.9 4.2 1.3 6.4 
27 Basic metals 1.2 0.5 1.1 0.3 1.7 0.5 1.7 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.3 2.0 1.3 0.9 0.7 
28 Fabricated metal products 1.2 1.0 1.9 1.1 3.2 2.3 3.0 0.9 2.2 1.4 3.0 2.6 2.9 0.7 1.5 
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.6 0.5 1.1 0.4 1.7 1.3 1.4 0.5 1.1 0.7 1.2 1.4 1.1 0.5 0.6 
30 Office machinery and computers 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.7 1.4 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 
31 Electrical machinery  0.5 0.2 1.3 0.2 1.2 1.0 1.3 0.3 0.6 0.4 1.1 1.2 0.5 0.2 0.6 
32 Radio, television and comm. eq. 0.5 0.7 1.3 0.4 1.4 0.7 2.2 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.1 
33 Medical and optical instruments 0.5 0.3 1.2 0.5 4.2 0.8 1.9 0.5 1.3 0.8 0.2 3.1 1.6 0.4 0.5 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers  0.6 0.4 0.7 0.6 1.6 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.8 
35 Other transport equipment 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.9 1.1 2.2 1.5 0.6 0.2 1.6 3.1 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.4 
36 Furniture; other manufactured goods  0.7 0.2 8.7 0.4 1.6 1.6 0.9 0.4 1.0 1.2 0.7 1.2 1.2 0.7 1.1 
Source: own elaboration.  
Non-EU countries: AUS: Australia; BRA: Brazil; CAN: Canada; CHN: China; IDN: Indonesia; IND: India; JPN: Japan; KOR: Korea; MEX: Mexico; RUS: Russia; TUR: 
Turkey; TWN: Taiwan; USA: United States; ROW: Rest of the World. 
* Carbon border tax calculated on the emissions avoided by Europe through trade. 
**Carbon border tax calculated on the emissions avoided by Europe through trade, adjusting for international prices differences. 
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